REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (INFO)

14JUL14

SPECIAL INQUIRY (II)

CONTROL: 14JUL14-MEKE-0006-7XCR

I/REPORT OF MISSING ALLEGED DOD MEMBER

COMMAND/DOD INTEREST/00000

MADE AT/MEKE/FORCE PROTECTION DETACHMENT KENYA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

NARRATIVE

- 1. On 13Jul14, Reporting Agent (RA) received a phone call circa 1720 from Special Agent (SA) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Assistant Regional Security Officer (ARSO), US Embassy Nairobi, Kenya (KE) advising an alleged member of the Department of Defense (DoD) may have been kidnapped.
- 2. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he received a call from Diplomatic Security (DS) Command Center, Roslyn, VA stating (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) notified the Norwegian Police that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) called her and said he has been kidnapped and needed money; no further information available. The Norwegian Police contacted US Embassy Oslo and reported this incident to SA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ARSO, US Embassy Oslo. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) subsequently reported this incident to the DS Command Center.
- 3. At approximately 1730 RA telephonically notified SA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
 Deputy Special Agent in Charge (Acting), Middle East Field Office, Manama,
 Bahrain. Additional notifications were made via email to COL(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
 USAF, Senior Defense Official/Defense Attache (Acting), US
 Embassy Nairobi, KE and US Africa Command Joint Operations Center,
 Stuttgart, Germany.
- 4. Multiple Threat Alert Center, Naval Criminal Investigative Service Headquarters, Quantico, VA attempted to identif $(M_0(6), (b)(7))$ us us DoD databases; however, efforts met with negative results. At approximately 1735 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised the aforementioned report was originally intended for Nigeria vice Kenya and follow on notification was made to the RSO, US Embassy Abuja.

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PAGE 1 LAST₀)(6), (b)(7 V2) LNN

Page (6): Case Control Number: 15JUN14-MEDJ-0061-7HNA/C - Referred to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations for review/returnPages (4) - (5): Case Co (USACIC) for review/returnPages (7) - (8): Case Control Number: 17APR15-MEDJ-0086-8ENA/C - Referred to the U. S. Army Criminal Investigations Command (USACIC) for review/return

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (INFO) 17AUG14 SEXUAL ASSAULT - ADULT (II) CONTROL: 17AUG14-MEDJ-0081-8SCR I/REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE, AFOSI CASE NO. 217-C-120-H1-33974140421550 MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)EXHIBIT(S) (1) IA: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW OF SRA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)NARRATIVE 1. Pursuant to lead-tasking relative to AFOSI Case No. 217-C-120-H1-33974140421550, SrA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) interviewed on Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, Africa on 07Aug14. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed regarding her knowledge of sexual assault allegations made by USAF, during a (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)deployment to Al Asad AFB, Iraq in late 2011. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)had very limited knowledge of and contact with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) , the subject of this investigation. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)reported to her that(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)would say sexual things in the workplace and was very "huggy," but (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had no knowledge of the allegations of sexual assault. Further details of the interview are included as Exhibit (1) to this report. In addition, the sworn statement obtained from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is included as Enclosure (A) to Exhibit (1). 2. Lead-tasking complete. DISTRIBUTION :AFOSI DET 217, 5285 E MADERA ST., DAVIS-MONTHAM AFB AZ

85707-4933 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SA, USAF) (M)/MEFO

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED)

17APR15

DEATH (II) CONTROL: 21JUN14-MEDJ-0065-7HNA/C

V/VILLOTCARRASCO, YESHABEL/SN USN F/W/NEE3/N/599287019/31DEC90

COMMAND/USS JAMES E. WILLIAMS (DDG95)/23148

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

REFERENCE (S)

- (A) NCISRA DJIBOUTI ROI (INTERIM) (Contains Exhibits 1-40)/22JUL14
- (B) NCISRA DJIBOUTI ROI (INTERIM) (Contains Exhibits 41-42)/06AUG14
- (C) NCISRA DJIBOUTI ROI (INTERIM) (Contains Exhibits 43-46)/12SEP14
- (D) NCISRA DJIBOUTI ROI (INTERIM) (Contains Exhibit 47)/110CT14
- (E) NCISRA DJIBOUTI ROI (INTERIM) (Contains Exhibits 48 -51)/190CT14
- (F) NCISRA DJIBOUTI ROI (INTERIM)/03NOV14

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- 1. This reactive investigation was initiated on 19JUN14 after CDRb)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, Commanding Officer (CO), USS JAMES E. WILLIAMS (DDG95) notified NCIS Resident Unit (NCISRU) Djibouti of the death of BMSN Yeshabel VILLOTCARRASCO (V/VILLOTCARRASCO), USN, while the ship was at sea off the coast of eastern Africa. CDR CALLOWAY advised that V/VILLOTCARRASCO had allegedly experienced a medical emergency in the Female Berthing 2. Command medical staff arrived in the berthing to treat V/VILLOTCARRASCO who was conscious but unresponsive to verbal stimuli. V/VILLOTCARRASCO was transported by Command stretcher-bearers to the medical facilities on board where life saving measures were administered but unsuccessful. V/VILLOTCARRASCO was pronounced dead at 1846 on 19JUN14. CDR CALLOWAY advised the ship would arrive in Djibouti on or about 21JUN14.
- 2. On 21JUN14, the USS JAMES E. WILLIAMS arrived in Djibouti and NCIS responded to initiate the investigation. Forensic Consultant (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was contacted telephonically from scene. Witnesses were interviewed and initial reports indicated V/VILLOTCARRASCO had ingested a bottle of sleeping pills. Death scene examination was completed, and on 21JUN14, V/VILLOTCARRASCO's remains were transported off the ship for transit back to the United States for autopsy. Additional logical interviews and review of evidence was completed on various dates. All investigative efforts are documented in References (A) (F). On 22Oct14, the Death Review Panel (DRP) unanimously agreed all investigative and administrative requirements had been met and recommended the file to be forwarded to the NCISHQ Death Review Board (DRB) for authorization to close this investigation. On 08Jan15, the NCISHQ Death Review Board (DRB) convened and authorized the

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17APR15

closure of the investigation.

NARRATIVE

- 1. This reactive investigation was initiated to investigate the circumstances of V/VILLOTCARRASCO's death. No criminal statutes apply.
- 2. On 19Oct14, this investigation was referred to the NCISFO Middle East Death Review Panel (DRP). On 22Oct14, the DRP convened and determined the investigation satisfied the NCIS requirements for the DRP. On 02Nov14 the DRP authorized the investigative file be forwarded to NCISHQ for a Death Review Board (DRB).
- 3. Subsequent to submission of Reference (F), on 08Jan15, a NCISHQ DRB convened and reviewed this investigation. DRB voting members consisted of SA (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (Division Chief and DRB Chairman), SA (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and SA(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) ollowing the review, the DRB authorized closure of this investigation.
 - 4. Per DRB authorization this investigation is now closed.

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED ONLY) 26SEP14 SEXUAL ASSAULT - ADULT (II) CONTROL: 25SEP14-MEDJ-0092-8SNA/C I/REPORT OF AN ALLEGED UNSOLICITED KISS ABOARD CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI COMMAND/CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/00000 MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU/ SPECIAL AGENT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)EXHIBIT(S) (1) Sworn Statement of Maj (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 23Sep14 (2) IA: Results of Contact with LS1 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on 17Sep14/25Sep14 (3) IA: Results of Contact with LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) VLC/25Sep14 (4) IA: Results of Contact with LS1 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on 18Sep14/26Sep14 (5) IA: Results of Contact with CPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA on 18Sep14/26Sep14 (6) IA: Results of Meeting with CPT(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and LS1 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on 18Sep14/26Sep14 (7) IA: Results of Contact with Lt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) VLC/26Sep14 (8) IA: Results of Attempted Interview of CPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on 20Sep14/26Sep14 (9) IA: Results of Contact with NCIS Legal Counsel/26Sep14 (10) IA: Results of Attempts to Contact CPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 23Sep14/26Sep14 (11) IA: Results of Contact with CPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 24Sep14/26Sep14 (12) IA: Results of Attempt to Interview CPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on 24Sep14/26Sep14 (13) IA: Results of Contact with CAPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) , Staff Judge Advocate HOA on 24Sep14/26Sep14 (14) Sworn Statement of Capt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF (15) IA: Results of Interview of Capt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF/26Sep14 (16) IA: Results of Permissive Search of (b)(6), (b)(7)(CFacebook Messages/26Sep14 (17) IA: Results of Permissive Search of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)CLU on 25Sep14/26Sep14 (18) IA: Results of Case Apprisal with CAPT USN/26Sep14 NARRATIVE investigation was initiated on 17SEP14 subsequent to notification from CAPT

1. This reactive investigation pertains to an alleged violation of Article 120 (Sexual Assault) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), CJTF-Horn of Africa (HOA), Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, of a reported allegation of an unsolicited kiss between two active duty members aboard Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported CPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA, spoke with Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa Inspector General Major USA, in mid-September (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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26SEP14

and related to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, tried to kiss (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) circa early to mid-August 2014 and may have contacted (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) neck or cheek in the process of doing so.

- 2. On 17Sep14, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was contacted wherein he related (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) confided in him in an attempt to seek advice on how to handle a situation wherein one night in early August, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) went to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CLU in order to pick up a tee shirt he brought her from Kenya. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said as she entered (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CLU, he attempted to kiss her but she dodged the kiss and at that point(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) lips contacted (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) cheek or neck. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related she remained at the CLU a short time longer and (b)(6), (b)(7)(again attempted to kiss her, at which time she left. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided a sworn statement regarding same on 23SEP14; Exhibit (1) pertains.
- 3. On 17Sep14, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Regional Sexual Assault Response Coordinator Commander Navy Region Europe, Africa & SW Asia was apprised of this investigation. on 17Sep14, LS1 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, Victim Advocate, was contacted. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)said she did not want to have an investigation started and did not want her name on any reports. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was asked to re-engage(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and advise NCIS if (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had interest in pursuing investigative endeavors; Exhibit (2) pertains.
- 4. On 18Sep14, LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, Victim Legal Counsel, was apprised of the status of this investigation; Exhibit (3) pertains.
- 5. On 18Sep14, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) replied to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) inquiry and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related she had not decided how she wanted to proceed; Exhibit (4) pertains.
- 6. On 18Sep14, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was contacted and asked to meet with NCIS and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at NCIS; Exhibit (5) pertains.
- 7. On 18Sep14, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported to NCIS wherein(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)was provided her options with how to proceed in accordance with the captioned investigation. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)did not wish to be interviewed or make any statement and wanted more time to make her decision. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)agreed to return to NCIS on 20SEP14 at 1030 in order to relay her decision in the matter; Exhibit (6) pertains.
- 8. On 18Sep14, Lt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, Victim Legal Counsel, was apprised of the status of the captioned investigation. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was provided with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) contact information in order to contact(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)if necessary; Exhibit (7) pertains.
- 9. On 20Sep14, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported to NCIS for the previously scheduled interview of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not show up for the interview. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not call or attempt to contact NCIS or (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to relate she was not attending the interview as scheduled. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was seen by NCIS aboard Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti on the same evening wherein she stated she was in presentations all day so she didn't come to the interview; Exhibit (8) pertains.
- 10. On 23Sep14, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CIV, Attorney Advisor, NCIS Headquarters, counseled against having (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) brought in by her superior and interviewed

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by NCIS; Exhibit (9) pertains.

- 11. On 23Sep14, multiple attempts to contact (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) met with negative results. NCIS was informed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) would return NCIS' phone calls but (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not do so; Exhibit (10) pertains.
- 12. On 24Sep14, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) agreed to come to NCIS at 1600 in order to be interviewed; Exhibit (11) pertains.
- 13. On 24Sep14, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported to NCIS at 1545 for the interview of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and NCIS waited until 1625 for(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to arrive. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not arrive. NCIS contacted (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated she would be at NCIS in 10 minutes. NCIS and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) waited until 1645 for (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) arrive to no avail. NCIS contacted (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) assist in locating (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) elated inquiries to identify (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) location met with negative results. NCIS and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) subsequently ceased waiting for (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Exhibit (12) pertains.
 - 14. On 24Sep14,(b)(6),(b)(7)(G) as advised of the status of the captioned investigation; Exhibit (13) pertains.
- 15. On 25Sep14, MASSA was interviewed at the NCIS office aboard Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. Prior to questioning (b)(6), (b)(7)(was advised of his Article 31(b) rights, which he waived(b)(6), (b)(7)(celated he and (b)(6), (b)(7)(celated a quick kiss at his CLU, B321, aboard Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti circa mid-August 2014(b)(6), (b)(7)(celated (b)(6), (b)(7)(celated (b
- 15. On 25Sep14,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)was apprised of the status of this investigation. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)concurred with the cessation of investigative endeavors.(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) advised no criminal process could take place with the facts and circumstances derived during the captioned investigation; Exhibit (18) pertains.
 - 16. All logical leads have been exhausted.
 - 17. This investigation is closed.

PARTICIPANTS

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT, DJIBOUTI - NCISRU

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NCISHQ:23B2/011C (RMB Files Section) (M)

INFO :SJA, CJTF-HOA, Djibouti (Attn: CAPTb)(6), (b)(7)(C) (H)/MEDJ/MEFO

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (INFO)

27SEP14

SPECIAL INQUIRY (II)

CONTROL: 27SEP14-MEDJ-0093-7XCR

I/DOD WORLDWIDE/CYBER CRIMINALS EXPLOIT MILITARY ADVANTAGE PROGRAM TO CONDUCT ONLINE VEHICLE SALES SCAM

COMMAND/DOD INTEREST/00000

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

NARRATIVE

- 1. This criminal intelligence report is being generated to provide current information regarding an online fraud scheme targeting DoD Personnel attempting to purchase vehicles under the guise of the Military Advantage Program (MAP), or vehicle purchase protection (VPP). This criminal intelligence was derived from a recent Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Intelligence Bulletin.
- 2. The FBI assesses with high confidence, cyber criminals are defrauding US military personnel and other consumers through the fraudulent representation of the vehicle purchase protection (VPP) program known as the Military Advantage Program, to entice victims into an online Internet vehicle sales scheme. Cyber criminals posing as US military personnel are placing fraudulent vehicle sales advertisements on Craigslist and enticing potential victims by advising them the transaction will be processed through the Military Advantage Program. The FBI judges this cyber fraud scheme may be an evolution of earlier tradecraft. The information is based on 1,038 consumer complaints received by the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) between 10 February and 18 April 2014, complaints received by the Overseas Military Sales Corporation (OMSC), and FBI source reporting.
- 3. Complaints received by the IC3 over a two month period in early 2014 revealed cyber criminals posed as US military personnel in order to sell personally owned vehicles. Victims believed they were responding to legitimate vehicle sale ads placed on Craigslist, when in fact the ads were fraudulent and the vehicles advertised did not exist. Cyber criminals pretended to be US military personnel online and advised their potential victims they needed to sell a vehicle quickly due to pending deployment orders or similar circumstances. Once the criminals begin corresponding with a potential victim, they informed the victim the transaction would be processed through the Military Advantage Program. The unsuspecting buyers would then send thousands of dollars upfront to pay for vehicles online, which they never received.
- 4. According to information from the IC3, 62 complaints were reported between 10 February and 18 April 2014, related to this online vehicle purchase scam. The complainants reported they were victimized after responding to an online vehicle sales ad on Craigslist portraying someone in the military either stationed overseas or being deployed overseas who needed

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27SEP14

to sell a vehicle located in the United States quickly. Scammers then informed the victims the transaction details would be handled through the Military Advantage Program. In addition, many consumers reported they made payments using Green Dot "MoneyPak" prepaid cards as well as Western Union wire transfers as requested by the scammers.

- 5. On 12 December 2013, the FBI received a complaint from the US Attorney's Office, Southern District of Alabama; regarding two subjects posing as military personnel attempting to sell vehicles via Craigslist. The complaint stated both subjects lured potential victims into the scam under the pretense purchases would be conducted using "Google Wallet" and "MoneyGram" prepaid cards for their protection, similar to methods used in the Military Advantage Program. An FBI IC3 database query uncovered 476 possible additional victim complaints, which referenced the same subjects, with victim losses totaling more than \$632,000.
- 6. According to the FBI, a high level representative of the OMSC, as of 25 February 2014, the OMSC had received more than 500 complaints from US military personnel notifying the company of an online vehicle sales scam. A typical scam consists of a Craigslist ad placed by an alleged US soldier advertising a vehicle for sale. In subsequent communications, the scammer advises potential buyers he needs to sell the vehicle quickly because he is being deployed to Afghanistan. The scammer also instructs his and requests payment via Moneygram. Once the payment is received, all communications with the buyer ends and the Craigslist ad is removed. The scammers often used names similar to plans offered by reputable online sales Web sites such as Ebay, Google, and Amazon, which typically offer buyer protection packages. To date, 1,038 victims have reported losses of more than \$817,000 related to this scheme.
- 7. The FBI assesses with high confidence, based on FBI reporting which is deemed reliable and the high number of IC3 complaints, cyber criminals will continue to use this scheme as it easily generates lucrative illicit profits and can be adapted for use on any Web site, using any number of misrepresentations of VPP or buyer protection programs such as the Military Advantage Program. Another attractive element of this scheme for overseas cyber criminals is the belief that they have a jurisdictional safety net to avoid prosecution as evidenced by wiring illicit proceeds overseas and potentially out of US law enforcement reach. In addition to posing as military officials, the FBI judges this successful fraudulent scheme may encourage scammers to defraud more victims by impersonating other demographic groups to perpetuate this type of fraud.

ACTION

0023:

For widest dissemination to the DOD as deemed appropriate as part of the NCIS 4th Quarter Crime Reduction Campaign.

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27SEP14

NCISHQ:23B4/CBFO/0023

ACTION:0023

INFO :002A/MEFO/MEDJ

Pages 22 through 24 redacted for the following reasons:

Page (22): Case Control Number: 28JAN14-MEDJ-0005-8SNA/C - Referred to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations for review/returnPages (23) - (24): Case (USACIC) for review/return